Political generalship
The essay below by Professor Bacevich has been circulating among some of my students at the staff college. A lot of interesting arguments–and more devastating for its sophistication than the ”Betray Us” foolishness.
Of course, there is much here that is debatable to say the least. The assertion that “Grant achieved his victories through brute force rather than finesse” is certainly off the mark a bit and Bacevich apparantly doesn’t understand that only weenies like McClellan ask for more troops (while truly great leaders close recruiting offices in the midst of potentially decisive campaigns)!
October 8, 2007 Issue
Copyright © 2007 The American ConservativeSycophant Savior
General Petraeus wins a battle in Washington—if not in Baghdad.
by Andrew J. Bacevich
In common parlance, the phrase “political general” is an epithet, the inverse of the warrior or frontline soldier. In any serious war, with big issues at stake, to assign command to a political general is to court disaster—so at least most Americans believe. But in fact, at the highest levels, successful command requires a sophisticated grasp of politics. At the summit, war and politics merge and become inextricably intertwined. A general in chief not fully attuned to the latter will not master the former.
http://www.amconmag.com/2007/2007_09_24/article2.html
Of course, if history is any guide on these matters, “always one step ahead” Mark has already referenced this on Blog them Out of the Stone Age! 
Mark Pyruz wrote:
There are a number of problems with the historical comparisons presented in this essay, particularly with its references to Washington and Grant. Professor Bacevich has obviously forfeited an academic examination of history for the purposes of making a political statement, similar in nature to that which he claims of General Petraeus.
Posted on 02-Oct-07 at 4:42 pm | Permalink
Brooks Simpson wrote:
“A political general in the mold of Washington or Grant would have taken a different course, using his moment in the spotlight not to minimize consternation but to stir it up to the maximum extent. He would have capitalized on his status as man of the hour to oblige civilian leaders, both in Congress and in the executive branch, to do what they have not done since the Iraq War began—namely, their jobs. He would have insisted upon the president and the Congress making decisions that wartime summons them—and not military commanders—to make.”
This sounds more like Grant during Reconstruction under Johnson than during the war itself.
Posted on 02-Oct-07 at 4:52 pm | Permalink